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a b s t r a c t 
Condition-based maintenance strategies adapt maintenance planning through the integration of online condition 
monitoring of assets. The accuracy and cost-eﬀectiveness of these strategies can be improved by integrating 
prognostics predictions and grouping maintenance actions respectively. In complex industrial systems, however, 
eﬀective condition-based maintenance is intricate. Such systems are comprised of repairable assets which can fail 
in diﬀerent ways, with various eﬀects, and typically governed by dynamics which include time-dependent and 
conditional events. In this context, system reliability prediction is complex and eﬀective maintenance planning 
is virtually impossible prior to system deployment and hard even in the case of condition-based maintenance. 
Addressing these issues, this paper presents an online system maintenance method that takes into account the 
system dynamics. The method employs an online predictive diagnosis algorithm to distinguish between critical 
and non-critical assets. A prognostics-updated method for predicting the system health is then employed to yield 
well-informed, more accurate, condition-based suggestions for the maintenance of critical assets and for the 
group-based reactive repair of non-critical assets. The cost-eﬀectiveness of the approach is discussed in a case 
study from the power industry. 
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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0. Introduction 
The main goal of maintenance is to achieve desirable system depend-
bility whilst minimising cost [1] . Dependability is a term that encom-
asses a range of attributes which include safety, reliability, availability,
nd maintainability [2] . Some industries are moving away from tradi-
ional time-based or reactive maintenance regimes towards condition-
ased maintenance (CBM), where intervention is scheduled when mon-
toring data indicates asset deterioration [1] . 
CBM applications have explored diﬀerent areas for cost-eﬀective
aintenance planning such as grouping maintenance strategies or up-
ating maintenance models with prognostics information. Grouping
aintenance actions together can reduce downtime and personnel costs
hrough considering functionally or spatially related assets within the
ystem [3–12] . Prognostics and health management (PHM) is an inte-
ral aspect of CBM which focuses on system degradation management
ith the following main groups of activities [13] : 
• Anomaly detection: monitoring and detection of abnormal condi-
tions in the system operation. ∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail address: jose.aizpurua@strath.ac.uk (J.I. Aizpurua). 
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fault. 
• Prognostics: predict the likely future degradation of the asset and
estimate its remaining useful life. 
• Operation and maintenance planning: mitigate the eﬀects of failure
and reduce unnecessary planned maintenance. 
PHM techniques have emerged as promising solutions for cost-
ﬀective asset management and maintenance planning [14–16] .
amely, the connection between prognostics and maintenance enables
pdating maintenance plans with up-to-date remaining useful life (RUL)
stimations [16–18] . 
The RUL denotes the time distance from the current prediction time,
 p , to the end of the useful life (or failure time) of the system denoted
OL : 
𝑈𝐿 = 𝐸𝑂𝐿 − 𝑡 𝑝 | 𝐸𝑂𝐿 > 𝑡 𝑝 (1) 
Given that remaining time after t p is random, uncertainty represen-
ation mechanisms are needed to model RUL [19,20] . Fig. 1 shows the
UL prediction concept, where 𝑌 = { 𝑦 1 , … , 𝑦 𝑛 } denotes gathered data the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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Fig. 1. Remaining useful life prediction. 
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damples up to the prediction point t p . The probabilistic estimation of
he health state at t p can be performed through diagnosis methods (e.g.
21] ). 
Depending on the speciﬁc prognostics prediction method, the format
f the RUL prediction results will be diﬀerent [19,16] : 
• deterministic RUL values 1 (e.g. calculated employing neural net-
works [22] ); 
• RUL values with conﬁdence intervals 𝑅𝑈𝐿 ± 𝐶𝐼 (e.g. estimated with
hidden Markov models [23] ); 
• probability density function (PDF) of the RUL (e.g. derived using
particle ﬁlters [14,24] ). 
So as to use prognostics results within CBM planning, one possibility
s to parametrize prognostics prediction results [25] . For deterministic
rediction results, the RUL value can be used directly assuming a con-
tant degradation rate and conﬁdence bounds can be used to estimate
aximum and minimum boundary values [26] . As for the PDF of the
UL, the PDF can be parametrized through regression methods (e.g.,
eibull regression [27,28] ), or alternatively mean, maximum and min-
mum RUL values can be calculated [25] . 
Despite these advances, cost-eﬀective CBM planning is far from triv-
al in complex industrial systems. Such systems are comprised of many
otentially repairable assets, which can fail in diﬀerent ways and with
arious eﬀects. The operation of assets and the system is typically
overned by dynamics which include time-dependent and conditional
vents and they cause complexities in the system reliability prediction
nd maintenance planning [29] . The use of combinatorial failure models
fault trees, reliability block diagrams) to model the failure logic of com-
lex systems has disadvantages for maintenance planning. For instance,
n a fault-tolerant system, the criticality of assets can change substan-
ially over time [30] : in a system with two parallel redundant channels,
hen one fails the criticality of assets within the single remaining chan-
el increases. Combinatorial failure models have limited ability to rep-
esent these situations. Therefore, system maintenance strategies based
ombinatorial failure models may also miscalculate dependability and
aintenance costs. 
Several dynamic dependability techniques have emerged to enable a
ore accurate analysis of dynamic scenarios that include state changes
nd sequencing of failures [31] . The application of these techniques for
BM planning would enable a more accurate health assessment estima-
ion compared with maintenance planning methods based on combina-
orial failure models. In this paper, we argue that the increasing capa-
ilities for prognostics and maintenance strategies along with dynamic
ependability models create opportunities for improved dependability
stimations and system maintenance planning. 1 Deterministic RUL values are sometimes denoted as average RUL or mean residual life 
16] . We will use the term RUL to denote deterministic RUL values and we will explicitly 
efer to the PDF of the RUL when needed. 
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172 In that context, optimization of system maintenance remains an open
esearch problem. Making progress in this area, in our view, requires in-
orporating accurate prognostic-enhanced dynamic dependability mod-
ls into maintenance planning. Preliminary work on incorporating prog-
ostics in a dynamic dependability model and informing asset-level
aintenance planning has been done in [32,25,33] , but this solves only
art of the problem. Moving from asset to system level maintenance re-
uires incorporating grouping criteria suited for dynamic failure logic
ystems. Dynamic dependability models can be used for clustering tasks
ased on the criticality analysis of assets. However, the connection be-
ween dynamic dependability models and potential maintenance strate-
ies is complex because unforeseen events have eﬀects on dependability
hich are hard to foresee a priori and cause eﬀects on the dependability
roﬁle of the assets and system making further maintenance decisions
arder. In particular, the speciﬁcation of diﬀerent groups of assets for
aintenance at diﬀerent intervals becomes hard because grouping cri-
eria and clusters should change dynamically to optimise dependability
nd cost. 
In this paper, our aim is to address some of the above challenges in
he dynamic planning of maintenance. The main contribution of this pa-
er is the proposal of an advanced system-level dynamic maintenance
lanning method building on our earlier work on prognostics-enhanced
ynamic dependability models for maintenance [25,33] . The core of
he proposed approach is a system-level maintenance planning algo-
ithm which coordinates predictive diagnostics activities and asset-level
rognostics information, and interacts with the dynamic dependability
odel. 
The online predictive diagnosis algorithm classiﬁes assets as criti-
al or non-critical according to their importance at the system level.
he system maintenance planning algorithm takes this information and
nteracts with the dynamic dependability model to implement group-
ng maintenance strategies and predict the consequence on the system
ealth. The dynamic dependability model is updated with prognostics
nformation, so as to yield well-informed, more accurate, condition-
ased suggestions for the maintenance of assets that have been iden-
iﬁed as critical and for the group-based reactive repair of assets that
ave been identiﬁed as non-critical. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents related work.
ection 3 introduces the prognostics-updated system maintenance ap-
roach for dynamic systems. Section 4 presents the implementation of
he proposed approach for asset and system level maintenance strate-
ies. Section 5 applies the proposed approach to a power transmission
ubstation case study. Section 6 discusses the applicability and limi-
ations of the method and Section 7 presents conclusions and future
rospects. 
. Related work 
Condition-based maintenance planning has recently gained interest
s a possible method of cost-eﬀective maintenance planning for stochas-
ically deteriorating assets and systems [34] . Diﬀerent cost-eﬀective
aintenance strategies have been proposed for asset-level condition-
ased maintenance focusing on speciﬁc failure modes such as fatigue
rack growth [14] or pitting corrosion [35] . 
When designing maintenance strategies for complex systems with
ultiple assets, engineers need to consider stochastic, structural, and
conomic dependencies between assets [36] . Stochastic dependency
mplies that asset degradation impacts the performance of other as-
ets, structural dependency means that maintaining an asset implies the
aintenance of other assets, and economic dependency addresses the
iﬀerence between group and independent maintenance actions. 
For eﬃciency, maintenance strategies with economic dependencies
ust allow for the grouping of assets in diﬀerent periods of mainte-
ance. This grouping can be static or dynamic to reﬂect changes in op-
rational circumstances [37] . Dynamic maintenance grouping methods
an be divided into ﬁnite horizon planning (no online re-planning) and
J.I. Aizpurua et al. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 168 (2017) 171–188 
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 olling horizon planning (long term plan revised as new information
ecomes available). We will review techniques that deal with a rolling
orizon because our work is focused on these systems. These techniques
ave been addressing various modelling challenges. Table 1 cites papers
ddressing in diﬀerent ways the asset degradation model, the system
ailure logic structure, dependencies, and the use of prognostics. 
Degradation model . The majority of maintenance models assume ei-
her Gamma [3,4,7,11,9] or Weibull [5,6,8,10] distributions for the
egradation modelling of system assets. The Gamma distribution mod-
ls a monotonic degradation process [38] . The Weibull distribution is
 well-studied generic distribution, which integrates other distributions
oo (exponential, Rayleigh). Embedding predeﬁned, well-studied, degra-
ation processes enables the posterior analytical treatment and imple-
entation of optimization strategies. However, as demonstrated in [16] ,
he use of explicit prognostics information may lead to more robust
aintenance strategies. Accordingly, we decouple the degradation mod-
lling process from the maintenance planning process as in [12] . 
System structure . Early work has looked into series systems [3–
,8,9,12] , while gradually series-parallel systems have been studied
6,10] . Recently, the inﬂuence of redundancy structures have been con-
idered studying K-out-of-N conﬁgurations [11] . This earlier work as-
umes that a system failure logic can be mapped to a combinatorial
oolean model for calculation of probability. This, however, is a sim-
listic assumption. In practice, assets interact in a manner that leads to
 more complicated failure logic. They can have several inter-dependent
ailure modes forming a complex network of stochastically dependent
ailure modes often with dynamic temporal relations among them. 
Dependencies . We can see in Table 1 that stochastic dependencies
ave not been addressed for grouping maintenance strategies. Only
orenbeek and Pintelon [4] consider asset stochastic dependencies by
ncluding the inﬂuence of corrective repair actions on other subsystems.
owever, none of the reviewed works take into account the eﬀect of
perational changes in the system such as the activation of mechanisms
hich can trigger further reactions in the system. For multi-component
ystems without grouping maintenance strategies, degradation interac-
ions have been taken into account, e.g. see [39] . Stochastic (and tem-
oral) dependencies have been studied also through dynamic depend-
bility models [31] , but for group-based maintenance planning these
ependencies have not been considered because they cause complexi-
ies in the analytic formulation. 
Prognostics . Some approaches integrate RUL prediction informa-
ion in the maintenance modelling approach [4,7,10,12] . Aligned with
his goal, we tailor maintenance strategies with up-to-date prognos-
ics prediction results. The integration of asset prognostics and system
valuation is done taking into account dependencies between assets
40,41] . Table 1 
Maintenance grouping approaches with rolling horizon. 
Ref. Degradation 
model 
System 
structure 
Dependencies Prognostics 
[3] Gamma Series Economic No 
[4] Gamma Series Economic, 
stochastic, structural 
Yes 
[5] Weibull Series Economic No 
[6] Weibull Series, 
parallel 
Economic No 
[7] Gamma Series, 
parallel 
Economic Yes 
[8] Weibull Series Economic No 
[9] Poisson, Gamma Series Economic No 
[10] Weibull Series, 
parallel 
Economic Yes 
[11] Poisson, Gamma K-out-of-N Economic No 
[12] Independent Series Structural, economic Yes 
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173 Grouping criteria . Following work in [37,3] all techniques displayed
n Table 1 focus on minimising maintenance costs by balancing waste
f useful life with increase in failure probability. For each speciﬁc ap-
roach, this optimization problem has been constrained by including
peciﬁc operation conditions such as imperfect maintenance actions [4] ,
aintenance opportunities [5] , dynamically changing contexts [6] , ef-
ect of maintenance actions on system reliability [7,10] , limited person-
el [8] , age-based grouping [9] or loss of functionality [12] . From the
ystem reliability perspective, one interesting alternative is to use im-
ortance measures to evaluate the degree to which an asset contributes
o the system failure and accordingly group assets with similar mea-
ures for joint maintenance. For instance, Vu et al. [10] use Birnbaum
mportance measures for deﬁning maintenance strategies. We focus on
mportance measures too, but for dynamic failure logic instead of as-
uming a combinatorial failure model. 
All the system maintenance models in Table 1 assume combinato-
ial failure logic. We move beyond this assumption to address dynamic
nd repairable systems, taking into account economic and stochastic
ependencies. In addition, we update the dynamic dependability evalu-
tion model with prognostics prediction results. The evaluation of these
ystems is achieved through the integration of dynamic dependability
valuation models with alternative maintenance strategies. 
Dynamic dependability models enable the modelling and probabilis-
ic analysis of dynamic failure logic systems with stochastic and tempo-
al dependencies (e.g., reconﬁgurable and fault-tolerant systems [42] ).
here is a range of dynamic dependability models that address these
ependencies: Boolean Driven Markov Processes [43] , Dynamic Fault
rees (DFT) [44] , Dynamic Bayesian networks [45] , Dynamic Reliabil-
ty Block Diagrams [46] , State-Event Fault Trees [47] , Temporal Fault
rees [48] , or hybrid DFT models [49] (see [31] for a comprehensive
verview). 
Apart from the analytic approaches displayed in Table 1 , there has
een work focused on the use of stochastic graphical models [45] and
imulation methods for maintenance planning. For instance, Petri nets
ave been used to evaluate the eﬀect of maintenance parameters on
he system performance for diﬀerent maintenance strategies. Zille et al.
50] proposed a reliability centred maintenance strategy, Andrews et
l. [51] introduced a railway track asset management model, and An-
rews and Fecarotti [52] presented an integrated Petri net and Bayesian
etwork modelling approach to evaluate the eﬀect of design and main-
enance options on system performance. Similarly, Alrabghi and Tiwari
ave used discrete event simulations to analyse maintenance strategies
or multi-component systems [53] , and Koutras et al. have employed
emi-Markov processes with Monte Carlo simulations to analyse main-
enance strategies for complex multi-state systems [54] . 
In this work we employ stochastic graphical models. Speciﬁcally
e focus on Stochastic Activity Networks (SAN), which is a variant of
tochastic Petri Nets [55] . We demonstrate that SAN enables the inte-
ration of dynamic dependability models [56] , prognostics prediction
nformation [25] , asset-level maintenance strategies [33] , and system-
evel dynamic grouping strategies (see Section 3 ). 
. Prognostics-updated system maintenance modelling for 
ynamic failure logic systems 
Fig. 2 shows the proposed maintenance planning approach divided
nto oﬄine and online activities and models. The oﬄine assessment is
ivided into two parallel sequences of activities: system dependability
nd prognostics modelling. The system design is the starting point and
t deﬁnes the functional operation of the system specifying how assets
re arranged to perform the system function. Prognostics and depend-
bility modelling activities follow system design and they join in the
nline evaluation part to update the dynamic dependability model with
rognostics results. 
J.I. Aizpurua et al. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 168 (2017) 171–188 
Fig. 2. Prognostics-updated system maintenance approach for dynamic failure logic sys- 
tems. 
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 The ﬁrst step in the dependability modelling sequence is the qualita-
ive dependability assessment . The result of this activity is a dynamic de-
endability model which deﬁnes the various dynamic sequences of asset
ailures that potentially cause system failure (see Section 3.2 ). Diﬀerent
ypes of dynamic dependability formalisms are applicable at this stage
31] . In this paper, without loss of generality, we focus on Dynamic
ault Trees (DFTs) [57] (see Section 3.4 ). 
In parallel, the prognostics sequence starts with the asset selection
tep. Each asset may have a diﬀerent degradation speciﬁcation. To spec-
fy a prognostics model, degradation equations or run-to-failure data
re compulsory [19] . Therefore, the asset selection activity for prognos-
ics evaluation is driven by the availability of data or equations. Ac-
ordingly, diﬀerent prognostics techniques can be considered to design a
rognostics model for each asset [19] . 
Until this point, the process is performed at design time or oﬄine.
e then move to an online analysis process, that enables evolutionary,
ynamic planning of maintenance during operation. 
The online analysis process is comprised of two sequences of activ-
ties focused on regularly updating the dynamic dependability model
ith prognostics results and evaluating the criticality of assets. 
Prognostics results depend on the nature of the prognostics model
19] . One possibility to update the failure rate and maintenance ac-
ions is to use the RUL estimation assuming a constant failure rate
 𝜆 ≈ 1∕ 𝑅𝑈𝐿 ) [26] . For prediction models which estimate a determinis-
ic value (including conﬁdence intervals) the RUL values can be mapped
irectly. As for the probabilistic RUL predictions with density values,
aximum, minimum and mean RUL values can be extracted ( Fig. 1 ).
e use this approximation to obtain the prognostics-updated dynamic de-
endability model . 
In order to determine the dynamically changing degree in which an
sset contributes to system failure, we implement a criticality assessment .
here are several importance measures that can be used to weigh the
riticality of an asset [58,59] . The evaluation of importance measures
or dynamic repairable systems is an open issue [60,61] . This paper uses
he failure criticality index ( ‘criticality ’ for short) [62,30] . We use this
ndex in an online context, and therefore the index is adapted as new in-
ormation becomes available. The aim is to classify assets as critical and
on-critical into two dynamic clusters with an evolving membership. 
Based on the criticality and prognostics information, dynamic mainte-
ance decisions are planned and represented on a prognostics-enhanced
ynamic dependability and maintenance model . This model is connected
ack with the criticality assessment to continually monitor the health of
ssets. 
A number of techniques have been proposed in the literature for the
ﬄine activities showed in Fig. 2 (e.g., see [19,31,63] ). Therefore, in
his paper we will focus on the online activities. For the sake of compari-
on, we will also examine asset-level maintenance strategies [33] which174 se the same modelling process as in Fig. 2 , without considering the
riticality assessment. The dynamic dependability and maintenance model
ould be quantiﬁed using analytic formulations or simulation. In the
ext subsection we will justify our choice. 
.1. Analytic formulations versus simulation 
The failure logic of complex dynamic systems can be expressed in
inimal cut-sequence sets (MCSQ), i.e. the dynamic counterpart of min-
mal cut-sets [64] . 
Merle et al. introduced an analytic formulation for non-repairable
ynamic systems with stochastic and temporal dependencies [65] . The
anonical form of the system failure expression, denoted top-event (TE),
s the disjoint sum of all its n independent MCSQs [66] : 
 𝐸 = 
𝑛 ∑
𝑖 =1 
𝑀𝐶𝑆𝑄 𝑖 (2) 
Each MCSQ i deﬁnes the temporal combination of basic events (BE)
hat cause the TE occurrence. The length of the MCSQ depends on
he minimal number of BEs that cause TE occurrence. Assuming that
 events cause the TE: 
𝐶𝑆𝑄 𝑖 = 𝐵𝐸 1 𝐎𝐏 𝟏 𝐵𝐸 2 𝐎𝐏 𝟐 … 𝐵𝐸 𝑘 (3) 
here 𝐎𝐏 𝐢 is the operator that deﬁnes temporal logic, e.g. 𝐎𝐏 𝐢 =
 𝑆𝐴𝑁𝐷 , 𝑃 𝐴𝑁𝐷 , 𝑃 𝑂𝑅 } [64] : 
• 𝑀𝐶𝑆𝑄 𝑖 = 𝐵𝐸 1 𝐒𝐀𝐍𝐃 𝐵𝐸 2 ∶ 𝐵𝐸 1 and BE 2 occur simultaneously;
• 𝑀𝐶𝑆𝑄 𝑖 = 𝐵𝐸 1 𝐏𝐀𝐍𝐃 𝐵𝐸 2 ∶ 𝐵𝐸 1 occurs before BE 2 , and BE 2 has
to occur; 
• 𝑀𝐶𝑆𝑄 𝑖 = 𝐵𝐸 1 𝐏𝐎𝐑 𝐵𝐸 2 : BE 1 occurs before BE 2 , but BE 2 does
not need to occur; 
These operators can also be combined with classical combinatorial
ogic operators such as 𝐀𝐍𝐃 , 𝐎𝐑 , etc. 
In order to analyse the failure expression, ﬁrst it is necessary to re-
ove redundant MCSQ terms taking into account the priority of dy-
amic operators [64] . The probabilistic failure expression can then be
btained by applying the inclusion-exclusion principle [67] . Finally, the
orresponding probabilistic formula should be applied to each MCSQ
erm and operator separately [65] . 
The above algebraic framework can be used for dependability eval-
ation of systems with non-repairable assets. However, the complexity
f the mathematical formulation grows with the system size, and for
ynamic systems with repairable assets, the logic and probabilistic for-
ulas cannot be captured by the above semantics. 
A feasible alternative is to use simulation-based dynamic depend-
bility techniques. The focus of these approaches has been centred on
he quantiﬁcation of the system failure probability through Monte Carlo
imulations using reactive repair strategies, e.g. [44] . In this work we
ill use simulation-based techniques for the implementation of dynamic
ependability and maintenance model . 
In the next subsection we deﬁne the dynamic dependability and main-
enance model . In Section 4 we explain the representation of asset and
ystem maintenance strategies. 
.2. Dynamic dependability and maintenance model 
Fig. 3 shows the proposed online maintenance modelling approach
xpanding the online activities in Fig. 2 . 
An informed system maintenance strategy must be based on an over-
ll picture of the systems health which is established through a set of
ctivities and models: 
• Dynamic dependability and maintenance model : a probabilistic model
that integrates prognostics and maintenance decisions and quan-
J.I. Aizpurua et al. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 168 (2017) 171–188 
Fig. 3. Proposed online maintenance approach. 
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Fig. 4. Notation of SAN elements. tiﬁes failure probabilities ﬁrst at asset level and then at system
level. 
• Criticality assessment : a system model, which identiﬁes the degree of
contribution of each asset to the failure of the system. 
• Dynamic maintenance planning : maintenance decisions derived from
criticality assessment. These deﬁne group maintenance and their ef-
fects redeﬁne the future health of assets and the next iteration of the
process. 
Each asset in the dynamic dependability and maintenance model is
odelled with three states. The transition from working (W) to failed
F) state is governed by the failure rate 𝜆( 𝑡 ) . This failure rate can be up-
ated with up-to-date degradation prediction information coming from
rognostics models [26,25,33] : 
( 𝑡 ) = 
{ 
𝜆0 0 < 𝑡 < 𝑇 𝑝 𝑘 
𝜆𝑘 𝑡 = 𝑇 𝑝 𝑘 
(4) 
here 𝜆0 is the initial failure rate estimate typically taken from a relia-
ility database, 𝑇 𝑝 𝑘 is the k -th prediction time instant, and 𝜆k is the fail-
re rate at k -th prediction time instant. The number of prediction time
nstants depends on the speciﬁc prognostics application (and available
ata) varying from 1 up to P prediction instants 𝑘 = {1 , … , 𝑃 } . 
Prognostics prediction times depend on the asset and the application
ontext. In an online monitoring context, RUL predictions can be per-
ormed continuously as new data is gathered from the asset under study.
owever, early RUL predictions may not be very accurate, whereas as
he system approaches its end of life, RUL predictions will become more
ccurate (see [68] for an analysis of the eﬀect of prognostics prediction
rrors on maintenance planning). In this case, a trade-oﬀ between accu-
acy and timeliness needs to be made. In contrast, in an oﬄine applica-
ion context, the data is not sampled continuously but at regular time
ntervals, e.g. transformer dissolved gas data may be sampled quarterly
r six times a year [69] . Therefore the prediction time instants in this
ase will be determined by the availability of monitoring data. As the
ealth of the asset deteriorates (and RUL decreases) the sampling regime
ay be increased to closely monitor the aging of the asset and perform
ore frequent prognostics predictions. 
Once the asset fails, there are two options depending on the main-
enance strategy. If the maintenance is implemented at the asset level,
t is repaired with a repair rate 𝜇( 𝑡 ) , which models the mean time to re-
air from failed to working state (see Section 4.1 ). However, for system
aintenance strategies, if the asset is not critical, it is possible to leave
he asset in the failed state until the maintenance planning diagnoses
 critical asset triggering a group maintenance signal GM (see Section
.2 ). 
It is possible to avoid the transition to the failed state by perform-
ng maintenance prior to the asset failure. The transition to the main-
enance state (M) depends on the maintenance strategy and it is deter-
ined by the transition rate 𝜔 ( 𝑡 ) . From the maintenance state, the asset175 eeds a time interval deﬁned by 𝜃( 𝑡 ) to return back to the working state.
sset maintenance decisions are applied independently to each asset i
 ∀𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑖 ∈ 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 ∶ 1 ≤ 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁) with an individual maintenance rate
 i . Maintenance decisions at the system-level apply only to critical as-
ets because the rest of non-critical assets are allowed to fail and they
re repaired through group maintenance strategies. 
The main assumptions adopted in this paper are twofold: assets are in
s bad as old state after repair (as in other stochastic models, e.g. [51] ),
nd there is availability of unlimited maintenance resources. We plan
o analyse imperfect and resource constrained maintenance strategies
n future work (see Section 7 ). 
The online maintenance approach is implemented through the SAN
ormalism introduced in the following subsection. After that, in Section
.4 , we will introduce the Dynamic Failure Logic block in Fig. 3 (or Dy-
amic Dependability Model in Fig. 2 ) using SAN modelling mechanisms. 
.3. Preliminaries on stochastic activity networks 
The Stochastic Activity Networks (SAN) formalism was ﬁrst intro-
uced in the mid-1980s [70] and it has been used for many diﬀerent
pplications. For the sake of readability and simplicity we will introduce
he main SAN modelling constructs semi-formally in this subsection. For
 full formal deﬁnition of SAN refer to [55] . 
SAN extends stochastic Petri Nets generalizing the stochastic rela-
ionships and adding mechanisms to construct hierarchical models. Fig.
 shows SAN modelling primitives [55] . 
Places represent the state of the modelled system. Each place con-
ains a certain number of tokens deﬁning the marking of the place. A
tandard place contains an integer number of tokens, whereas extended
laces contain data types other than integers (e.g., ﬂoats, array). We
ill denote the marking function of the place x as m( x ), e.g., m( x ) = 1
eans that the place x has a marking equal to 1. 
There are two types of activities : instantaneous which complete in neg-
igible amount of time, and timed whose duration has an eﬀect on the
ystem performance and their completion time can be a constant or a
andom value. When it is a random value, it is ruled by a probability
istribution function deﬁning the time to ﬁre the activity. 
Activities ﬁre based on the conditions deﬁned over the marking of the
et and their eﬀect is to modify the marking of the places. The comple-
ion of an activity of any kind is enabled by a particular marking of a set
f places. The presence of at least one token in each input place enables
he ﬁring of the activity removing the token from its input place(s) and
lacing them in the output place(s). 
Each activity has a reactivation function that deﬁnes when the activ-
ty is aborted and a new activity time is immediately obtained from the
ctivity time distribution. The reactivation function provides a mecha-
ism for restarting activities that have been activated, either with the
ame or a diﬀerent distribution. To this end it is necessary that both the
eactivation predicate holds for the new marking and for the marking
n which the activity was originally activated; and the activity remains
nabled. 
Another way to enable a certain activity consists of input gates and
utput gates . Input and output gates make the SAN formalism general
nd powerful enough to model complex real situations. They determine
he marking of the net based on user-deﬁned C++ rules. 
J.I. Aizpurua et al. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 168 (2017) 171–188 
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a  
sInput Gates (IG) control the enabling of activities and deﬁne the
arking changes that will occur when an activity completes. A set of
laces is connected to the input gate and the input gate is connected
o an activity. A Boolean condition (or guard) enables the activity con-
ected to the gate and a function determines the eﬀect of the activity
ompletion on the marking of the places connected to the gate. Output
ates (OG) specify the eﬀect of activity completion on the marking of
he places connected to the output gate. An output function deﬁnes the
arking changes that occur when the activity completes. 
The performance measurements are carried out through reward func-
ions deﬁned over the designed model. Reward functions are evaluated
s the expected value of the reward function and they are deﬁned based
n: 
• the marking of the net ( state reward function ), e.g. quantiﬁcation of
the probability for being in a speciﬁc place; 
• completion of activities ( impulse reward function ), e.g. count the num-
ber of times an activity triggers within a time interval. 
In order to alleviate substantially the state explosion problem SAN
akes use of reduced base models [71] . This concept enables the im-
lementation of join operators and hierarchical modelling of complex
ystems. 
Fig. 5 shows a simple repairable asset example. In this case the SAN
laces are initialized to working state < m( 𝚆 ) , m( 𝙵 ) > = < 1 , 0 > . The token
ill move from W to the F place according to the distribution determined
y fault timed activity. The time to failure will be calculated with
he parameters of the fault activity and after the time to failure has
lapsed the system will move to the failed state < 0 , 1 > . After moving to
he failure state the time to repair will be calculated from the repair
imed distribution and the token will move from F to W place after the
alculated time to repair has elapsed. 
In this paper we focus on Monte Carlo simulations for the quantiﬁ-
ation of diﬀerent probabilities. If we want to evaluate the failure prob-
bility or availability we can use the reward functions indicated in Fig.
 with F _ Rew and W _ Rew reward variables respectively. These state-
ents are evaluated for a large number of Monte Carlo trials and the
xpected value of these random variables evaluated at diﬀerent time
nstants will give the failure probability and availability indicators. 
Formally, if we want to evaluate the probability of a generic place x ,
t time instant t , ﬁrst we deﬁne the reward function, r x ( t ), as follows: 
 𝑥 ( 𝑡 ) = 
{ 
𝑟 𝑥 ( 𝑡 ) + 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑚 ( 𝚡 ) = 1 
𝑟 𝑥 ( 𝑡 ) 𝑖𝑓 𝑚 ( 𝚡 ) = 0 
(5)
Note that the marking of the place x will change according to the
AN atomic logic throughout the lifetime of the system. Besides, for
iﬀerent Monte Carlo trials, the transition times and marking values
ill be diﬀerent. If we perform N Monte Carlo trials, the expected value
f the reward function of the place, r x , (probability for being in place x
t time t ), is calculated as follows: 
̂ 𝑥 ( 𝑡 ) = 
1 
𝑁 
Σ𝑁 
𝑖 =1 𝑟 
𝑖 
𝑥 
( 𝑡 ) , 𝑥 ∈ 𝐸 (6)
here E denotes the set of places in the system e.g., 𝐸 = { 𝚆 , 𝙵 } in
ig. 5 . Fig. 5. Repairable asset example in SAN. 
176 The inverse transform sampling method [72] extracts the stochas-
ic occurrence times of timed activities using Monte Carlo simulations.
et CDF be a cumulative distribution function, r be a random variable
rawn from the uniform distribution 𝑟 ∼ 𝑈 ([0 , 1]) , and TTF the time to
re the activity. Then, the inverse sampling method applies the relation
 
−1 ( 𝑟 ) = 𝑇 𝑇 𝐹 to draw the time to ﬁre according to the CDF. 
The same concept as in Eq. (6) applies to the calculation of the num-
er of actions. In this case impulse reward functions are deﬁned over
he activity of interest. Let us assume that we deﬁne for the activity a
he impulse reward, r a , which is dependent on the activity completion
ime or time to ﬁre, TTF a : 
 𝑎 = 
{ 
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 = 𝑇 𝑇 𝐹 𝑎 
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
(7) 
For each Monte Carlo trial the TTF a will vary according to the ran-
om number r . We can evaluate the number of times an activity a ﬁres
uring a time interval Δ𝑡 = 𝑇 𝑚 − 𝑡 0 after performing N simulations as
ollows: 
̂ 𝑎 (Δ𝑡 ) = 
1 
𝑁 
Σ𝑁 
𝑖 =1 Σ
𝑇 𝑚 
Δ𝑡 = 𝑡 0 
𝑟 𝑖 
𝑎 
(Δ𝑡 ) , 𝚊 ∈ 𝐴 (8) 
here A denotes the set of activities in the model, e.g. in Fig. 5 𝐴 =
 𝚏𝚊𝚞𝚕𝚝 , 𝚛𝚎𝚙𝚊𝚒𝚛 } . 
Note that the required number of iterations N in Eqs. (6) and (8) de-
end on the required conﬁdence level for the reward variables [71] . In
his work all the experiments have been performed with a conﬁdence
evel of 0.99 and a minimum conﬁdence interval of 1e-6. Accordingly,
he simulations are halted when all the failure probability estimations
atisfy the conﬁdence interval constraints (worst case 𝑁 ≈3e6) . 
The SAN models which include the speciﬁed SAN elements are mod-
lled in a SAN atomic model (see Fig. 7 Reusable Block column). The
oin operator links through a compositional tree structure diﬀerent SAN
odels in a unique composed model . As shown in Fig. 8 places of diﬀer-
nt atomic models are joined to represent interactions between diﬀerent
AN models. It is possible to link atomic models, composed models, or
ombinations thereof. In the tree structure, the composed and atomic
AN models are linked through join operators using shared places be-
ween the composed and atomic SAN models. Thus, the analyst can focus
n speciﬁc characteristics of the asset behaviour through ﬁt-for-purpose
tomic and composed models and later join independently validated
odels to obtain a more complex composed system model. 
The SAN model in Fig. 5 can be reused to link the places with other
ssets. For instance, if we want to initiate another (timed or immediate)
ctivity in another asset when the failure of the model in Fig. 5 occurs,
e can join the F place with the destination SAN model through SAN
oin mechanism (see Fig. 8 for an example). For the composed system
he quantiﬁcation of system probabilities is exactly the same as for the
imple system in Fig. 5 . In this case the reward function in Eq. (5) must
e deﬁned in terms of the system failure place ( TE in Fig. 8 ). 
.4. Dynamic failure logic modelling in SAN 
The dynamic failure logic modelling process is the same for asset
nd system maintenance strategies. The main diﬀerence between these
trategies is on the asset-level modelling (see Fig. 3 and Section 4 ). Fig. 6. Subset of Dynamic Fault Tree gates. 
J.I. Aizpurua et al. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 168 (2017) 171–188 
Fig. 7. Speciﬁcation of repairable DFT gates in SAN. 
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lThe dynamic failure logic is formalized using a dynamic dependabil-
ty model and in this case we use repairable DFTs [57] . The repairable
FT model links low-level repairable basic events (i.e. assets in Fig. 3 )
ith the system-level failure events (top-event) through dynamic gates.
epairable DFT gates are deﬁned as follows [44] : 
a) PAND: 𝑌 = 𝑃 𝐴𝑁𝐷 ( 𝐸 1 , … , 𝐸 𝑁 ) ; Y is true iﬀ all events { 𝐸 1 , … , 𝐸 𝑁 }
are true and they occur in order: 𝐸 1 ⊲ ⋯ ⊲ 𝐸 𝑁 ; otherwise is false
( Fig. 6 a). 
b) Spare: 𝑌 = 𝑆𝑃 ( 𝐸 𝑎𝑐 1 , … , 𝐸 𝑎𝑐 𝑀 , 𝐸 𝑠𝑝 1 , … , 𝐸 𝑠𝑝 𝑁 ) ; Y is true iﬀ all active
events { 𝐸 𝑎𝑐 1 , … , 𝐸 𝑎𝑐 𝑀 } and all spare events { 𝐸 𝑠𝑝 1 , … , 𝐸 𝑠𝑝 𝑁 } have
failed, otherwise is false . Its inputs can be in standby, working or
failed state (cf. Fig. 6 b). 
c) FDEP: [ 𝐸 1 , … , 𝐸 𝑁 ] = 𝐹 𝐷𝐸𝑃 ( 𝑇 ) ; { 𝐸 1 , … , 𝐸 𝑁 } is true if the trigger
event T occurs or they fail by themselves; otherwise is false (cf. Fig.
6 c). 
A fourth gate called sequence enforcing gate has also been deﬁned
n [57] . However note that this gate can be implemented using a spare
ate [73] and also note that the FDEP gate can be modelled using OR
ates [27] . 
In this paper we will focus on PAND and SPARE gates. Fig. 7 shows
he speciﬁcation of repairable DFT gates in SAN using state machines
nd their corresponding SAN model [56] . Note that we have not in-
luded the SPARE gate in Fig. 7 because this is modelled as an AND
ate, including basic events which can be in standby states (e.g. see Fig.
0 ) and implementing the activation logic between basic events. In the
tate machine the initial state is highlighted in grey, failure states are
dentiﬁed with doubled circles, and F x and R x indicate failure and re-
air events of x . The resultant reusable blocks are used to link with basic
vents and other gates. Note also that the DFT gates in Fig. 7 are directly
xtendible to gates with N input events. 
So as to evaluate the output of a gate it is necessary to link the gates
n Fig. 7 with basic events (i.e., assets). To this end we synthesize all
he expressions in the DFT model using the join operator in SAN [56] .177 ig. 8 shows a synthesis example assuming assets with independent re-
ctive repair strategies as also shown in Fig. 5 . 
At the lowest level ﬁrst we model reactive repair strategies for each
sset in the system ( Asset1 , Asset2 , Asset3 ) with independent re-
air rates. Then we synthesize the PAND operation by linking the A and
 places of the PAND gate in Fig. 7 with KO _ Asset1 and KO _ Asset2
laces respectively. To this end, we use the join operator of SAN. This
ill result in the creation of the PAND _ A1A2 reusable block. Then we
ink the output place of this submodel ( PAND _ Out ) and the KO place of
he Asset3 with the inputs of the OR gate in Fig. 7 . 
The system-level failure probability is then quantiﬁed by monitor-
ng the Y place of the OR gate (renamed to TE in Fig. 8 ) which indi-
ates the occurrence logic of this gate (see Fig. 7 ) and the failure of
he system in Fig. 8 . The marking of a place is monitored through re-
ard variables as explained in Section 3.3 . In this case we replace the
lace x in Eq. (5) with the place TE of Fig. 8 . The marking of this place
ill be dependent on the underlying failure logic ( PAND gate) and asset
 Asset1 , Asset2 , Asset3 ) models. The asset-level failure probabil-
ty is quantiﬁed by monitoring the failure place of the asset under study,
.g. for Asset3 we need to deﬁne a reward variable by replacing x with
O _ Asset3 in Eq. (5) (see also Fig. 5 ). 
Fig. 9 shows the system level failure probability quantiﬁed with
AATSS [44] and SAN models with constant hypothetical failure and re-
air parameters ( 𝜆1 = 0.1 years − 1 , 𝜇1 = 2 years − 1 , 𝜆2 = 0.05 years − 1 , 𝜇2 = 1
ears − 1 , 𝜆3 = 0.5 years − 1 , 𝜇3 = 3 years − 1 ). RAATSS implements repairable
FT models for assets with reactive repair strategies based on Adaptive
ransition Systems [44] . 
Results shown in Fig. 9 conﬁrm the validity of the DFT gates pro-
osed in Fig. 7 and the synthesis process shown in Fig. 8 . These con-
epts can be generalized for more complex systems and it is possible to
nclude reconﬁguration activities so as to activate standby elements by
etting their standby place when required [42] , as in the Activate
lace in Fig. 10 . We use the same modelling process throughout the
aper to evaluate the system failure probabilities at asset and system
evels. 
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Fig. 8. DFT synthesis example. 
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b. Multi-level maintenance modelling for dynamic failure logic 
ystems 
In this section we will present detailed maintenance modelling con-
epts to represent condition-based asset and system level maintenance
trategies based on the approach shown in Fig. 3 . 
.1. Asset-level maintenance strategies 
Condition-based maintenance strategies can use prognostics predic-
ions to adapt the maintenance schedule and extend the useful life of
he asset. As shown in Fig. 3 , the maintenance instant 𝜔 ( 𝑡 ) is deﬁned as
74] : 
 ( 𝑡 ) = 1 
𝑅𝑈𝐿 ( 𝑇 𝑝 ) − 𝑆𝐹 
(9)
here RUL ( T p ) is the remaining useful life at prediction time T p and SF
s a safety factor which integrates the time required to trigger mainte-
ance and uncertainties associated with the RUL prediction. 
The selection of the SF for timely maintenance decision making de-
ends on two factors. The ﬁrst is the time needed to trigger mainte-178 ance, and this is asset and failure speciﬁc. For instance, oﬀshore wind
urbines require travel time which is dependent on the weather and sea
onditions [75] . The second factor is the uncertainty associated with
UL prediction. Assuming deterministic RUL predictions with the con-
dence interval CI , the ﬁnal predictions will be 𝑅𝑈𝐿 ± 𝐶𝐼 . In order to
void failure occurrences, the most conservative SF may be selected as-
uming the worst case scenario, i.e. the sum of the conﬁdence interval
nd maximum time needed to trigger the asset maintenance. 
Accordingly, when a new prognostics prediction is performed at any
rediction time instant T p , the condition-based maintenance schedule
an be adapted with up-to-date condition information of the asset: 
 ( 𝑡 ) = 
{ 
𝜔 0 0 < 𝑡 < 𝑇 𝑝 𝑘 
𝜔 𝑘 𝑡 = 𝑇 𝑝 𝑘 
(10) 
here 𝜔 0 is the initial maintenance rate, 𝑇 𝑝 𝑘 is the k -th prediction time
nstant, and 𝜔 k is the maintenance rate at k -th prediction time instant
s deﬁned in Eq. (9) . 
Fig. 10 shows the asset-level condition-based maintenance model im-
lemented in SAN divided into Asset , Control , and Maintenance
locks. 
J.I. Aizpurua et al. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 168 (2017) 171–188 
Fig. 9. Failure probability assessment of the system in Fig. 8 . 
Fig. 10. Asset CBM model for asset-level maintenance. 
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r  The Asset block integrates OK , KO , StandBy and Activate
laces with Fail and Repair timed activities and an instantaneous
ctivity Inst , which links StandBy and Activate places. The
ail activity is updated with prognostics prediction results stored in
he Preds extended place (in the Control block). When the as-
et is repaired, it remains in the StandBy state until it receives an
ctivate signal from the reconﬁguration mechanism. 
The Control block implements the system update actions through
he Check OG. This block is executed deterministically, every Det
ime period ( Δ𝑡 simulation timestep) controlling the marking of the
ampling place. The Fail and MaintCBM activities in the Asset
lock are reactivated and updated with new transition rates via the
ambda and Omega extended places respectively ( 𝜆( 𝑡 ) and 𝜔 ( 𝑡 ) in Fig.
 ). The SF place stores the safety factor to calculate 𝜔 ( 𝑡 ) (cf. Eq. (9) ). The
pdate logic embedded in the Check OG monitors the prediction time
nstants stored in Preds , updates Lambda and Omega places, and en-
bles their reactivation through the React extended place. Algorithm
 deﬁnes the prognostics update process implemented in the Check
G. 
lgorithm 1. Update of failure and maintenance rates in SAN using
rognostics prediction information. 
1: for 𝑡 = 0 ∶ Δ𝑡 ∶ 𝑇 𝑚 do 
2: if t = 𝑡 𝑝 𝑘,𝑖 , ∀𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑖 ∈ 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 ∶ 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁 , k = {1,…,P} then ⊳ p
3: 𝜆𝑖 ( 𝑡 ) = 1∕ 𝑅𝑈𝐿 𝑘,𝑖 ⊳ update failure r
4: 𝜔 𝑖 ( 𝑡 ) = 1∕( 𝑅𝑈𝐿 𝑘,𝑖 − 𝑆𝐹 𝑖 ) ⊳ update
5: 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 ( 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑖 , 𝑡 𝑝 𝑘 , 𝜆𝑖 ( 𝑡 )) ⊳ resa
6: 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 ( 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑖 , 𝑡 𝑝 𝑘 , 𝜔 𝑖 ( 𝑡 )) ⊳
7: end if 
8: end for 
In Algorithm 1 , if the time equals the prediction time 𝑡 𝑝 𝑘 (where
 = {1 , … , 𝑃 } and P denotes all the prediction instants), of any of the
rognostics models of any asset ( ∀𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑖 ∈ 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 ∶ 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁), we up-
ate the corresponding asset’s failure rate and condition-based main-179 ⊳ throughout the mission time 
stics prediction instant 𝑡 𝑝 𝑘 for the i-th asset 
ith prognostics at k-th prediction instant for the i-th asset 
 rate with Eq. (9) , assuming exponential distribution 
 the failure distribution with the new 𝜆𝑖 ( 𝑡 ) in SAN 
mple the CBM distribution with the new 𝜔 𝑖 ( 𝑡 ) in SAN 
enance rate in Eq. (9) with the newly obtained RUL prediction. The
esampling property is already implemented in SAN through reactiva-
ion functions (see Section 3.3 ). Line 5 updates the Fail activity and
ine 6 updates the MaintCBM activity obtaining new activity times
rawn from the exponential distribution with the prognostics-updated
arameters. 
The Maintenance block implements planned shutdown events.
he MaintCBM timed activity models the 𝜔 ( 𝑡 ) event in Fig. 3 and Eq.
9) . MaintCBM has a reactivation logic to update the transition rate to
he Maint place according to prognostics prediction results and predic-
ion instants stored in the Preds place. The MaintDuration activity
odels the 𝜃( 𝑡 ) event in Fig. 3 . 
Accordingly, when modelling asset maintenance strategies, each as-
et in the DFT model (e.g., see Fig. 8 ) is modelled using an instance of
he model shown in Fig. 10 with the corresponding asset-speciﬁc pa-
ameters. 
.2. System-level maintenance strategies 
The system group-based maintenance approach uses all the activities
nd models in Fig. 3 . Fig. 11 shows the high-level operation sequence
omprised of four sequential steps: 
a) Dynamic dependability and maintenance model informs maintenance
planning about the health status of assets and failure time instants
throughout the lifetime (see Section 4.2.1 ). 
b) Dynamic maintenance planning calls criticality assessment to assess op-
erative assets’ criticality. 
c) Criticality assessment diagnoses if the asset under study is critical (see
Section 4.2.2 ). 
d) The dynamic maintenance planning implements maintenance actions
depending on the criticality of assets (see Section 4.2.3 ). 
The criticality assessment is implemented through C++ libraries
hich are connected with the SAN model. In this way the criticality as-
essment can be called as a conventional function with its input param-
ters from any SAN model (see Section 4.2.2 ). 
.2.1. Dynamic dependability and maintenance model 
Assets with system-level maintenance are modelled in SAN as
hown in Fig. 12 divided into Asset , Control , Maintenance , and
ystem blocks. The Asset , Control , and Maintenance blocks
erform in the same manner as for asset-level maintenance models (see
ection 4.1 ). 
The System block implements waiting options according to the
ystem maintenance strategy. That is, GroupRep can trigger group
epair actions when WaitCritical is activated and MaintCBM
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Fig. 12. Asset CBM model for system-level maintenance. 
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Fig. 14. Criticality assessment. 
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t  an trigger CBM actions when EnableSystem _ CBM is activated. Be-
ides, the System block triggers the criticality analysis by setting the
heckCriticality place and calling the criticality assessment when
here is a failure occurrence (through the CriticalityFail OG),
epair activity (through the CriticalityRep OG), or maintenance
ction (through the CriticalityCBM OG). The RCrit activity trig-
ers repair actions of critical assets in case the CBM action is missed,
ith the same parameters as GroupRep activity. 
The Dynamic Failure Logic block in the Dynamic Dependability and
aintenance model ( Fig. 3 ) implements in SAN the failure logic of the
FT gates and links failed states of the assets with the failure logic (see
ection 3.4 ). In parallel, after every failure, repair or maintenance occur-
ence of any asset, the marking of CheckCriticality is set, and the
ealth state and failure time information of each asset ( KO , FailTime
laces in Fig. 12 ) are sent to the criticality assessment (see Section 4.2.2 ).
After diagnosing if there is a critical asset, maintenance decisions
re adopted by the dynamic maintenance planning . This activity changes
he marking of the WaitCritical and EnableSystem _ CBM places
epending on the speciﬁc situation, and accordingly it triggers group-
ased and critical assets maintenance actions, respectively. 
The MaintCBM activity is a stochastic event and the transition time
s extracted according to the inverse transform method ( Section 3.3 ).
here may be cases that the Fail activity ﬁres faster than MaintCBM
ctivity, and the asset transits to the KO state. The RCrit activity re-
airs individual critical assets that miss the transition to the Maint
lace. If we change the MaintCBM to a instantaneous activity, then
he system failure probability will be always zero because preventively
e move the asset to a safe state as soon as it is diagnosed as critical.
e have used this strategy to validate the correctness of the diagnostics
unction. 
.2.2. Criticality assessment 
The goal of this module is the identiﬁcation of assets that cause the
ystem failure. The criticality of assets changes throughout the lifetime
f the system due to the simultaneous occurrence of failure, repair and
aintenance events. For instance, in the example shown in Fig. 13 , the
riticality, cr ( t ), changes at diﬀerent time instants as follows (critical
aths are indicated with a dashed line and failed events are indicated
ith a double circle): 
a) 𝑐𝑟 ( 𝑡 0 ) = { 𝐷} 
b) Asset B fails with 𝑡 0 < 𝑡 < 𝑡 1 ; 𝑐𝑟 ( 𝑡 1 ) = { 𝐶, 𝐷} 
c) Asset A fails with 𝑡 1 < 𝑡 < 𝑡 2 ; 𝑐𝑟 ( 𝑡 2 ) = { 𝐶, 𝐷} 
d) Asset B is repaired with 𝑡 2 < 𝑡 < 𝑡 3 ; 𝑐𝑟 ( 𝑡 3 ) = { 𝐵, 𝐷} 
The criticality of dynamic repairable systems can be evaluated with
ndicator functions and failure timestamps of all the basic events of the
ystem. The indicator function I takes values in the set  = {0 , 1} andi 
180 ndicates the actual health state of the basic event i . That is, I i = 1 if
sset i is in the failed state, I i = 0 if it is working. The failure timestamp
 𝑓 𝑖 
indicates the failure occurrence time of the basic event i : 𝑡 𝑓 𝑖 > 0 if
ailure occurred, 𝑡 𝑓 𝑖 = 0 if working or repaired. 
Accordingly, for the implementation of the criticality assessment
e use a parallel health monitoring DFT model which implements the
ame dynamic failure logic as the dynamic dependability and maintenance
odel , but it is only used for diagnosis purposes and not probabilistic
uantiﬁcation. It takes health state indicators and failure time instants
f all the assets and evaluates their criticality. 
If we want to foresee which are the critical assets that can cause the
ystem failure occurrence, one possibility is to change the indicator func-
ion of each operative asset to the failed state and evaluate the system
ailure expression, diagnosing the system-level eﬀect for each potential
sset failure. Every time there is a change of health state in any asset
failure, maintenance or repair), it is necessary to check if the failure
f an operative asset would cause the system failure, given the speciﬁc
peration conditions. Fig. 14 shows the criticality analysis assuming
hat we are interested in evaluating the criticality of the Asset i at 11.5
ime units. Note that the asset models in the criticality assessment are
omprised of health state indicators and the failure timestamps. 
This concept can be integrated within the SAN modelling formalism
s a standalone C++ library which can be used at runtime during the
AN model simulation. Accordingly, we have created the corresponding
ibraries to implement and evaluate the qualitative outcome (i.e., criti-
ality) of DFT repairable gates as shown in Table 2 . The behaviours of
epairable DFT gates are deﬁned according to their input events (in 1 ,
n 2 ), which can be extended to an arbitrary number of input events. 
Instantiating and linking the inputs and outputs of the gates in
able 2 according to the system failure logic enables the qualitative
riticality assessment of the eﬀect of a low-level basic event failure on
he system failure occurrence. For instance, the criticality assessment
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Table 2 
C++ libraries for the qualitative DFT assessment. 
Function Description 
{ 𝐼 𝑜𝑢𝑡 , 𝑡 𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡 } = AND ( [ 𝐼 𝑖𝑛 1 , 𝑡 𝑓 1 ] , [ 𝐼 𝑖𝑛 2 , 𝑡 𝑓 2 ] ): 
 𝑖𝑛 1 
× IR + 
𝑖𝑛 1 
×  𝑖𝑛 2 × IR 
+ 
𝑖𝑛 2 
→  𝑜𝑢𝑡 × IR + 𝑜𝑢𝑡 
𝐼 𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 1 iﬀ 𝐼 𝑖𝑛 1 = 1 and 
𝐼 𝑖𝑛 2 = 1; 𝑡 𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡 = max( 𝑡 𝑓 1 , 𝑡 𝑓 2 ) 
{ 𝐼 𝑜𝑢𝑡 , 𝑡 𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡 } = OR ( [ 𝐼 𝑖𝑛 1 , 𝑡 𝑓 1 ] , [ 𝐼 𝑖𝑛 2 , 𝑡 𝑓 2 ] ): 
 𝑖𝑛 1 
× IR + 
𝑖𝑛 1 
×  𝑖𝑛 2 × IR 
+ 
𝑖𝑛 2 
→  𝑜𝑢𝑡 × IR + 𝑜𝑢𝑡 
𝐼 𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 1 iﬀ 𝐼 𝑖𝑛 1 = 1 or 
𝐼 𝑖𝑛 2 = 1; 𝑡 𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡 = min( 𝑡 𝑓 1 , 𝑡 𝑓 2 ) 
{ 𝐼 𝑜𝑢𝑡 , 𝑡 𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡 } = PAND ( [ 𝐼 𝑖𝑛 1 , 𝑡 𝑓 1 ] , [ 𝐼 𝑖𝑛 2 , 𝑡 𝑓 2 ] ): 
 𝑖𝑛 1 
× IR + 
𝑖𝑛 1 
×  𝑖𝑛 2 × IR 
+ 
𝑖𝑛 2 
→  𝑜𝑢𝑡 × IR + out 
𝐼 𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 1 iﬀ 𝐼 𝑖𝑛 1 = 1 and 
𝐼 𝑖𝑛 2 = 1 and 𝑡 𝑓 1 < 𝑡 𝑓 2 ; 
𝑡 𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡 = max( 𝑡 𝑓 1 , 𝑡 𝑓 2 ) 
m
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todel in Fig. 13 is instantiated as follows: 
 𝐼 𝑇𝐸 , 𝑡 𝑓 𝑇𝐸 
} = 𝐎𝐑 ( 𝐏𝐀𝐍𝐃 ([ 𝐼 𝐴 , 𝑡 𝑓 𝐴 ] , [ 𝐼 𝐵 , 𝑡 𝑓 𝐵 )] , 
𝐀𝐍𝐃 ([ 𝐼 𝐵 , 𝑡 𝑓 𝐵 ] , [ 𝐼 𝐶 , 𝑡 𝑓 𝐶 ]) , [ 𝐼 𝐷 , 𝑡 𝑓 𝐷 ]) (11) 
Assuming that the health state of the system in Fig.
3 is < 𝐼 𝐴 , 𝐼 𝐵 , 𝐼 𝐶 , 𝐼 𝐷 > = < 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 > and failure times are
 𝑡 𝑓 𝐴 
, 𝑡 𝑓 𝐵 
, 𝑡 𝑓 𝐶 
, 𝑡 𝑓 𝐷 
> = < 12 , 8 . 5 , 0 , 0 > ; the criticality result would be
cf. Fig. 13 c): I TE = 1 only iﬀ I C = 1 or I D = 1, because 𝑡 𝑓 𝐴 > 𝑡 𝑓 𝐵 . 
To generate the system-level failure expression the designer has to
now beforehand the DFT failure logic of the system ( Dynamic Depend-
bility Model in Fig. 2 ). Based on this logic the designer needs to synthe-
ize the failure logic in a C++ library and link the library with the SAN
odel. The generated library will instantiate the gates in Table 2 ac-
ording to the system-speciﬁc failure logic (see Eq. (11) for a library
xample). The link between the SAN model and C++ libraries enables
he use of the generated logic function from the SAN model at runtime,
nd the foresight of which are the critical assets at each simulation time
nstant. 
lgorithm 2. System level maintenance algorithm. 
1: for 𝑡 = 0 ∶ Δ𝑡 ∶ 𝑇 𝑚 do 
2: if ( CheckCriticality i ), ∀𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑖 ∈ 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 ∶ 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁 t
3: for 𝑗 = 1 ∶ 𝑁
4: If (m( 𝙾𝙺 𝚊𝚜𝚜𝚎𝚝 𝚓 ) ∥ m( 𝚂𝚝𝚊𝚗𝚍𝙱𝚢 𝚊𝚜𝚜𝚎𝚝 𝚓 )) then 
5: let m( 𝙺𝙾 𝚊𝚜𝚜𝚎𝚝 𝚓 ) = 1 
6: 𝑐𝑟 𝑗 ← 𝑐 𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ([ 𝑚 1 , 𝑡 𝑓 1 ] , [… , …] , [ 𝑚 𝑁 , 𝑡 𝑓 𝑁 ]) 
7: if 𝑐𝑟 𝑗 = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 then 
8: 𝚖 ( 𝙴𝚗𝚊𝚋𝚕𝚎𝚂𝚢𝚜𝚝𝚎𝚖 _ 𝙲𝙱𝙼 𝚊𝚜𝚜𝚎𝚝 𝚓 ) = 1 
9: end if 
10 end if 
11: end for 
12: if 𝚖 ( 𝙴𝚗𝚊𝚋𝚕𝚎𝚂𝚢𝚜𝚝𝚎𝚖 _ 𝙲𝙱𝙼 𝚊𝚜𝚜𝚎𝚝 𝚒 ) = 1 , ∀i ∈N then ⊳ If we hav
13: for 𝑗 = 1 ∶ 𝑁 do 
14: If 𝚖 ( 𝙺𝙾 𝚊𝚜𝚜𝚎𝚝 𝚓 ) then 
15: 𝚖 ( 𝚆𝚊𝚒𝚝𝙲𝚛𝚒𝚝𝚒𝚌𝚊𝚕 𝚊𝚜𝚜𝚎𝚝 𝚓 ) = 1 
16: end if 
17: end for 
18: end if 
19: end if ⊳ at this point, the eﬀect of the f
20: end for 
The criticality assessment evaluates the system failure occurrence
iven input conditions, but it does not aﬀect directly the dynamic depend-
bility and maintenance model . This model is connected with the dynamic
aintenance planning through the implementation of waiting-to-repair
nd waiting-to-maintain signal options as shown in Fig. 12 . Therefore,
he criticality assessment informs the dynamic maintenance planning , and
his impacts on the performance of the dynamic dependability and main-
enance model through repair and maintenance decisions. 
.2.3. Dynamic maintenance planning 
The dynamic maintenance planning module monitors actively the criti-
ality of all the operative assets through the criticality assessment module181 ⊳ for all the mission time 
⊳ check if the failure, CBM, or repair of any asset occurs 
⊳ identify which are the operative assets 
⊳ change asset state to failed to check if it is critical 
⊳ asses the criticality if asset j would fail 
⊳ If it is a critical asset 
⊳ Enable the CBM action 
ntiﬁed a critical asset and enabled CBM 
⊳ Among all the system assets 
⊳ Check which are the non-critical failed assets 
⊳ And activate group-repair of non-critical assets 
f the asset i in the criticality has been checked 
o as to adapt to the failure, repair, and maintenance events. We keep
rack of failure, repair and maintenance events and failure time instants
hroughout the simulation by monitoring the marking of the places in
he SAN model ( Fig. 12 ). Every time the dynamic maintenance planning
alls the criticality assessment , a criticality signal, cr , will be generated
or each operative asset. 
In order to trigger a group maintenance action the dynamic mainte-
ance planning has to identify a critical asset. Two actions are adopted,
epending on whether the asset is critical or non-critical (see Fig. 12 ,
ystem block). 
1. Critical asset: the maintenance planning activates the
EnableSystem _ CBM place immediately after diagnosing a
critical asset. Thereby, if the asset is critical and it is in the OK state,
it will be maintained according to the condition-based maintenance
interval implemented through the MaintCBM activity. If the Fail
activity triggers before MaintCBM , the critical asset will move
ﬁrst to the KO state, and then it will be repaired through RCrit
activity. 
2. Non-critical asset: if the asset is in the KO state, it will be repaired
immediately after receiving the WaitCritical signal. The main-
tenance planning will broadcast the WaitCritical signal to all
the failed non-critical assets as soon as a critical asset is diagnosed. 
Algorithm 2 shows the grouping process for system-level condition-
ased maintenance strategies evaluated throughout the mission time T m :
• Lines 2-6 : if there is any fault among all the system assets, or if
any asset is repaired or maintained, CheckCriticality i is ac-
tivated ∀ 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑖 ∈ 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 ∶ 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁 ( Fig. 12 ). Then we check the
criticality of all the remaining operative assets in the system through
the criticality analysis. 
• Lines 7-9 : if any of the operative assets are critical, cr j , then we
enable the condition-based maintenance for the asset j . 
• Lines 12-18 : if there is any critical asset in the system, we repair
all the failed assets together by enabling the group-based repair. 
The outcome of the criticality assessment is the system-level indica-
or function I TE ( t ) which indicates if the given input conditions at time
 cause the system failure (see Fig. 11 ). According to Algorithm 2 the
ynamic maintenance planning can check the criticality of all the opera-
ive basic events in the system to foresee a critical failure occurrence.
he dynamic maintenance planning takes this information and decides to
rigger a group repair or wait until a critical failure occurs. 
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Fig. 15. System failure probability with diﬀerent maintenance strategies for the DFT in 
Fig. 13 . 
Table 3 
Repair and maintenance actions in Fig. 15 . 
Asset Asset-level System-level 
# CBM # Repair # CBM # GroupRepair 
A 11.2 4.8 2.3 
∑
= 17 . 45 
B 11.15 4.8 4.09 
C 11.22 4.8 3.59 
D 11.2 4.8 5.3 ∑
44.77 19.2 15.28 
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Fig. 16. Example Dynamic Fault Tree model. 
Fig. 17. System failure probability with diﬀerent maintenance strategies for the DFT in 
Fig. 16 . 
Table 4 
Repair and maintenance actions in Fig. 17 . 
Asset Asset-level System-level 
# CBM # Repair # CBM # GroupRepair 
A 11.14 4.76 0.4 
∑
= 17 . 27 
B 11.32 4.88 0.37 
C 3.88 2.15 2.7 
D 11.28 4.69 1.54 
E 4.44 2.18 3.63 ∑
42.06 18.66 8.64 
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cAfter detecting a critical asset, instead of triggering the group re-
air instantaneously as in Algorithm 2 lines 12--18 , it is possible
o postpone the group repair up to the CBM time of the critical asset.
owever, this decision increases the failure probability of the system
aintenance strategy. There is a race condition between MaintCBM
nd Fail activities to move the asset from OK to Maint or KO state,
espectively. The later we trigger the maintenance action in a critical
tate, the higher the likelihood to miss the maintenance time, and ac-
ordingly, asset and system failure probabilities increase. 
.2.4. System maintenance planning sensitivity 
The eﬀectiveness of the system maintenance planning depends on
he criticality of assets. In turn, the criticality of assets depends on the
FT model, their position in the DFT model, and their failure param-
ters. So as to examine the sensitivity of the proposed system mainte-
ance algorithm we will analyse diﬀerent DFT models with diﬀerent re-
undancy and criticality levels. Let us assume that all the basic events of
ll the DFT models analysed in this subsection have the same speciﬁca-
ions: 𝜆𝑡 0 = 1∕10 years 
−1 , 𝜆𝑡 1 = 1∕6 years 
−1 , 𝜆𝑡 2 = 1∕5 years 
−1 , t 0 = 0; t 1 = 8
ears, t 2 = 10 years, SF = 3 years. We use the same prediction instants and
alues for all the assets to analyse the sensitivity of Algorithm 2 for dif-
erent systems under the same conditions. We will relax this assumption
n the case study analysed in Section 5 . 
Fig. 15 shows the system failure probability of the DFT in Fig. 13 us-
ng asset and system maintenance strategies. Vertical dashed lines indi-
ate prognostics prediction and failure probability update instants. We
an see that the system failure probability is the same for both mainte-
ance strategies. 
Table 3 displays the number of asset-level repair actions (#Repair),
he total number of system-level group repair actions (#GroupRepair),
nd maintenance (#CBM) actions for asset and system maintenance
trategies over 30 years. With system-level maintenance, the indepen-
ent sum of asset repair actions is not the same as the total number of
epair actions, because assets are repaired in clusters and these clusters
hange throughout the lifetime of the system. Therefore #GroupRepair
enotes the total non-overlapping group repair actions performed in the
ystem. 
The number of repair and maintenance actions are quantiﬁed using
onte Carlo simulations counting the number of times the maintenance
ctivity MaintCBM and repair activities Repair and RCrit trigger
n the models shown in Figs. 10 and Figs. 12 for asset and system main-
enance strategies respectively. Each Monte Carlo trial calculates an in-182 eger number of actions, but after averaging with the total number of
terations, the ﬁnal results become real values (see Eq. (8) ). 
We can see in Table 3 that the system maintenance strategy reduces
reventive maintenance and reactive repair actions. For the asset main-
enance strategy the number of CBM and repair actions are the same for
ll the assets because we use the same failure, maintenance and repair
arameters. For system maintenance strategies, the more critical the as-
et, the more maintenance actions and vice-versa. In this case we can see
n Table 3 that the most critical asset is D and the least is A . According
o the DFT in Fig. 13 we can see that D is a single point of failure and
 is the least critical because it requires time-dependent events, which
re more restrictive than AND logic operations. 
If we add more redundancies to the system, we will reduce the criti-
ality of assets and the number of CBM actions in the system-level main-
enance strategy. Let us consider the DFT model in Fig. 16 , with the same
ailure, maintenance, and repair rates as before. 
Fig. 17 conﬁrms that the system failure probability decreases with
espect to Fig. 15 . In addition, we can see that the failure probability of
he system maintenance strategy is slightly higher than the asset-level
onﬁguration. 
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Fig. 18. Asset-level failure probability with diﬀerent maintenance strategies for the DFT 
in Fig. 16 . 
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Table 5 
RUL values (in years) at prediction times T p . 
Assets Tr1 Tr2 Tr3 Tr4 CB1 CB2 CB3 CB4 
𝑇 𝑝 0 10 10 10 10 2 2 2 2 
𝑇 𝑝 1 4 5 7 7 1 1 1.5 1.5 
𝑇 𝑝 2 3 4 5 5 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.8 
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fThe CBM or group repair is enabled after diagnosing a critical as-
et. The criticality changes after failure, repair or maintenance actions.
his means that, the more reliable the architecture, the less frequently
here will be a criticality change in the system. Therefore, the repair and
aintenance actions will be enabled less frequently and accordingly, the
ailure probability for the system maintenance strategy will be increased
ith respect to the asset maintenance strategy. 
Table 4 displays the number of triggered maintenance and repair
ctions in 30 years. We can see that maintenance and repair activities
re reduced with respect to Table 3 for the system maintenance strategy.
ince we use the same failure, repair and maintenance parameters as in
ig. 13 , the asset maintenance strategies show very similar values to
hose in Table 3 , with the exception of those for assets C and E . These
ssets are inputs of a spare gate (with activation priority of E over C)
nd therefore they can be in standby state, which reduces maintenance
nd repair actions (see Fig. 10 ). 
We can also observe in Table 4 that the most critical asset is E and
he least critical asset is B . Fig. 18 shows the asset failure probabilities
or assets B and E . Fig. 19. Transmission substation conﬁguration. 
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Fig. 20. Dynamic Fault Tree model of the
183 We can see in Fig. 18 that the more critical the asset, the less dif-
erence there is between asset failure probabilities under each mainte-
ance regime. Asset B is a non-critical asset and accordingly, the failure
robability diﬀerence for diﬀerent maintenance strategies is bigger. In
he previous case shown in Fig. 13 , the asset level failure probabilities
re similar for all the assets because their criticalities are similar too.
he implemented system maintenance strategy reduces the asset-level
iﬀerences at the system-level. 
. Case study 
The correct operation of a transmission substation is critical for
ower grid performance. Fig. 19 shows a conﬁguration example of a
ransmission substation comprised of circuit breakers (CB) and trans-
ormers (Transf.). 
The repair of the transformer is a very expensive and time consuming
rocess [69] . Accordingly, the transmission substation is designed to be
 fault tolerant system. In the conﬁguration shown in Fig. 19 , there are
lways two active transformers and the other two are in standby mode.
ny time an active transformer fails, a standby transformer is activated.
We deﬁne the failure condition of the transmission substation in Fig.
9 with DFT gates (see Section 3.4 ). Fig. 20 deﬁnes the DFT model of
he transmission substation shown in Fig. 19 . 
The DFT model in Fig. 20 can be interpreted as follows. The system
ailure will occur either because: 
• Two transformers fail and two complementary circuit breakers have
already failed (IE1-IE6). 
• One transformer fails and three complementary circuit breakers have
already failed (IE7-IE10). 
• All transformers fail (spare gate). 
The spare gate determines the activation priority of the inputs from
eft to right order. That is, any time Tr 1 is available, its activation is
referred over the rest of transformers which are in standby state. 
Accordingly, we have used the Dynamic Fault Tree model in Fig.
0 to evaluate the system and asset failure probabilities with prognostics
redictions in Table 5 and 𝜇= 0.1 years; 𝜃= 0.1 years ( Fig. 3 ).  transmission substation in Fig. 19 . 
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Fig. 21. SAN model of the transmission substation. 
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WTable 5 displays the RUL values assumed for transformers and circuit
reakers. If available, it is possible to replace these values with realistic
gures for circuit breakers [ 76,80 ] and transformers [24] . For simplic-
ty we have adopted hypothetical reasonable values. We assume that at
he initial prediction time instant (t = 𝑇 𝑝 0 ) the estimated RUL for all trans-
ormers is 10 years and 2 years for circuit breakers. Since Tr1 and Tr2 are
he preferred transformers, they will age more rapidly than Tr3 and Tr4.
he prediction times for transformers are 𝑇 𝑝 1 = 4 and 𝑇 𝑝 2 = 6 years. As
or circuit breakers, the prediction times are 𝑇 𝑝 1 = 0 . 5 and 𝑇 𝑝 2 = 1 years.
e have assumed that the safety factor for transformers is 1 year and
.1 year for circuit breakers. 
.1. Implementing the SAN model 
Fig. 21 shows the SAN implementation of the transformer substation
FT model ( Fig. 20 ) with system-level maintenance. For transformers,
he asset models in Figs. 10 and 12 are implemented for asset and system
aintenance strategies, respectively. For circuit breakers the same mod-
ls are used without StandBy and Activate places, connecting the
epair and MaintDuration activities directly with the OK place. 
Firstly we initialize (i) the parameters of the atomic SAN models of
ach asset of the system with: failure rate, repair rate, maintenance rate,
rediction times and corresponding RUL values ( 𝜆i , 𝜇i , 𝜔 i , 𝜃i , 𝑇 𝑝 𝑖 , RUL i ;
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑖 ∈ 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 ∶ 1 ≤ 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁); and (ii) the marking of its places to
he initial state: 
• CB1, CB2, CB3, CB4: m( OK ) = 1, m( KO ) = 0, m( Maint ) = 0,
m( WaitCritical ) = 0, m( CheckCritical ) = 0, m( Enable-
SystemCBM ) = 0. 
• Tr1, Tr2: m( OK ) = 1, m( KO ) = 0, m( Standby ) = 0, m( Maint ) = 0,
m( Activate ) = 0, m( WaitCritical ) = 0, m( CheckCriti-
cal ) = 0, m( EnableSystemCBM ) = 0. 
• Tr3, Tr4: m( OK ) = 0, m( KO ) = 0, m( Standby ) = 1, m( Maint ) = 0,
m( Activate ) = 0, m( WaitCritical ) = 0, m( CheckCriti-
cal ) = 0, m( EnableSystemCBM ) = 0. 
For each asset, the Check output gate implements the update pro-
ess to resample the failure and maintenance rates using prognostics
rediction results through Lambda , Omega , React , SF , and Preds
laces as deﬁned in Algorithm 1 . 
After deﬁning the atomic SAN models for the assets, the system fail-
re logic is deﬁned. The system failure modelling process follows the
ame process as deﬁned in the synthesis example in Fig. 8 . The failure
laces of assets (denoted as KO places) are joined with the failure places
f failure logic gates (denoted as A , B places in Fig. 7 ) to model the fail-
re logic of the system deﬁned in Fig. 20 . Note that Fig. 21 only shows
E1 , IE10 and Spare _ Tr submodels in detail because IE2 - IE9 sub-
odels have the same failure logic. At the top-level model, all the places
f all the assets are joined so as to create unique states for each asset
nd manage repeated events. 
In parallel, so as to implement reconﬁguration events
hrough the Activate places of the transformers, a
econfigure _ Transformer model is created. The reconﬁguration
ogic in Reconfigure _ Transformer implements the priority of
he transformers. Any time a transformer fails, the transformer with the
ighest priority is activated. If a transformer with a higher priority is re-
aired, it remains in the standby state until a lower priority transformer
ails. Accordingly, the reconﬁguration logic has been implemented
n the SAN according to the priority of the transformers and possible
ailure and repair events [42] . Namely, when a standby transformer
eeds to be activated, the marking of the corresponding Activate
lace is set. Fig. 22 shows the Reconfigure _ Transformer model
ith reconﬁguration sequence examples. 
At the top-level model, the operation ( OK ), failure ( KO ), Standby
nd Activate places of all transformers are joined with the
econfigure _ Transformer logic to implement the reconﬁgura-184 ion logic and change the marking of the transformers’ places to reﬂect
econﬁgurations and state changes. 
Fig. 23 shows the SystemManager SAN atomic model, where the
ysManager input gate implements Algorithm 2 . 
Any time there is a change in the health state of any asset, the
heckCriticality place is set at the asset-level SAN atomic
odel so as to communicate with the SystemManager model. The
ysManager input gate will take as input CheckCriticality ,
ailureTime and KO places of all the assets, and ﬁrst it will eval-
ate if the change of health state of the asset aﬀects the criticality.
hen depending on the situation deﬁned in Algorithm 2 , it will acti-
ate group repairs and condition-based maintenance actions through
aitCritical and EnableSystemCBM places, respectively. 
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Fig. 22. Reconﬁguration process for the transformer. 
Fig. 23. System manager model. 
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Table 6 
Repair and maintenance actions for asset and system level maintenance strategies of the 
transmission substation in Fig. 20 . 
Asset Asset-level System-level 
# CBM # Repair # CBM # GroupRepair 
Tr1 0.85 0.72 0.36 Σ = 14 . 38 
Tr2 0.85 0.72 0.36 
Tr3 0.85 0.72 0.041 
Tr4 0.85 0.72 0.007 
CB1 16.38 12.98 0.0197 
CB2 16.33 12.98 0.0208 
CB3 10.58 9.26 0.024 
CB4 10.63 9.41 0.033 
Σ 57.32 47.51 0.5415 
Fig. 24. System-level failure probability of the transmission substation in Fig. 19 . 
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fThe SAN modelling process for the asset-level maintenance strategy
s the same as in Fig. 21 without system manager dependencies. The
sset models are replaced with manager-independent models as shown
n Fig. 10 and the top-level model will not have the SystemManager
odel [33] . 
In both cases, failure, reconﬁguration, repair, and maintenance
vents will impact directly on asset models and top-level system fail-
re logic. According to these events the assets will change their mark-
ng (health status) and this will instantaneously impact on the system
ailure logic changing the marking of the logic gates. Finally, asset and
ystem level failure probabilities are evaluated through reward variables
s deﬁned in Eq. (6) by monitoring the places of interest. Namely, asset-
evel failure probability is monitored through KO places and transmis-
ion substation system failure is monitored through the Y place of the
R gate. 185 Similarly, the number of condition-based maintenance actions,
CBM, are quantiﬁed using Eq. (8) by monitoring the asset-level
aintCBM activity. For asset-level maintenance strategies #Repair ac-
ions are calculated through the Repair activity ( Fig. 10 ), whereas
GroupRepair actions are quantiﬁed by the system manager model ( Fig.
3 ) counting the number of independent group repair actions. 
.2. Results 
Table 6 shows the number of preventive maintenance and reactive
epair actions for asset and system maintenance strategies. Focusing on
sset-level results, we can see that the preventive maintenance actions
re in proportion with the values in Table 5 , e.g. for CB1 with a RUL of
.5 years at 𝑇 𝑝 2 , it is expected that the maintenance will trigger around
0 times (or more due to the safety factor). When the asset is not re-
aired preventively, the asset will be repaired reactively. 
If we focus on system-level actions in Table 6 we can see that there
s a signiﬁcant reduction in the total number of triggered reactive repair
nd preventive maintenance actions. The total number of group repair
ctions are three times less than independent asset repair actions. The
BM actions are also reduced because this is only triggered when an
sset is diagnosed as critical. 
Fig. 24 shows the eﬀect of preventive maintenance and repair ac-
ions on the system failure probability for both strategies. We can see
hat the asset maintenance strategy has a lower failure probability, at
he cost of triggering more repair and maintenance events ( Table 6 ). 
Fig. 25 shows the asset failure probabilities for CB1 and Tr1 using
ystem and asset maintenance strategies. We can see that the failure
robability diﬀerence is greater for non-critical assets (CB1) than for
ritical assets (Tr1). This reﬂects the eﬀectiveness of Algorithm 2 , imple-
enting preventive maintenance for critical assets and reactive repair
or non-critical assets. 
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Fig. 25. Asset-level failure probability of the transmission substation in Fig. 19 . 
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[  . Discussion 
Depending on the application speciﬁc requirements, the proposed
lgorithm permits the evaluation of whether it is cost-eﬀective to trig-
er more maintenance and repair actions, or whether it is feasible to
ostpone them at the cost of slightly increased failure probability at
he system level. In this paper the cost-eﬀectiveness has been evaluated
y considering the number of triggered maintenance and repair events
or the diﬀerent maintenance strategies. However, as part of our future
ork we will address a more complete cost-eﬀectiveness analysis includ-
ng asset costs, planned shutdown costs, downtime costs, maintenance
osts and prediction costs (see Section 7 ). 
The SAN models presented in this paper impact directly on diﬀerent
ependability attributes. The failure probability estimations for diﬀerent
aintenance strategies shown in Figs. 24 and 25 impact not only on re-
iability and maintenance planning, but also on safety. The dynamic de-
endability model quantiﬁes the probability of occurrence of hazardous
vents, i.e. transmission substation failure in Fig. 20 . With the considera-
ion of prognostics information, from the point of view of safety, a better
icture of the system health is obtained which can help to improve the
eﬁnition of safety margin values and avoid hazardous consequences
hrough up-to-date operational information. Note also that the dynamic
ependability model includes repair actions, and accordingly, assessing
he probability of being in the working state would lead directly to the
vailability assessment. 
Note also that the failure, maintenance and repair rates can be mod-
lled with any parametrized distribution functions. We have used the
onstant degradation as an example, but it is perfectly possible to use,
.g. Weibull or Gamma distributions, because the time to failure is
rawn from the inverse sampling method ( Section 3.3 ). One possible
xtension may be to use generic distributions for those cases in which
he outcome of the prognostics method is the PDF of the RUL ( Section
 ). 
. Conclusions 
In this paper, we proposed a method for prognostics-enhanced main-
enance of complex dynamic systems which includes a new algorithm
or cost eﬀective grouping of assets. If the failure of an asset is not crit-
cal, i.e. it does not cause system failure, we leave it to fail and we
epair all non-critical assets together after diagnosing a critical asset.
or critical assets, we have implemented condition-based maintenance
trategies based on RUL estimations. We have used Stochastic Activity
etworks (SAN) for the assessment of the proposed maintenance ap-186 roach. In SAN we have integrated Dynamic Fault Tree models with
rognostics prediction results, criticality assessment, and alternative
aintenance strategies in a rich model that can improve the accuracy of
lanning. 
The proposed grouping maintenance algorithm reduces preventive
aintenance and reactive repair actions. The experiments presented
erify the eﬀectiveness of the algorithm. We have also conﬁrmed that
he structure of the dynamic dependability evaluation model plays a vi-
al role in the proposed system-level maintenance strategy. That is, the
ore reliable the system architecture, the less critical each asset will be,
nd accordingly preventive maintenance actions will be reduced and the
ystem failure probability is increased. 
Future work can address the extension of the proposed framework
or the: 
• cost-eﬀectiveness analysis [33] ; 
• integration of generic distributions models, e.g. [54] ; 
• integration of other importance measures [59,77] ; 
• analysis of opportunistic maintenance with multi-criteria decision
making [78] ; 
• evaluation of resource constrained and imperfect maintenance ac-
tions [79] . 
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